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BOOK REVIEW
RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW By Mark Tushnet.* Harvard
University Press, 1988. Pp. 328, including indexes.
Reviewed by Raymond B. Marcin**
Mark Tushnet's newest book provides a look at constitutional theory from
the vantage point of the Critical Legal Studies movement.' As one might
expect of works produced out of the movement, it is unsettling and provoca-
tive. As one might expect of works by Mark Tushnet, it is a very good read.
Tushnet has a dual theme in his introduction: (1) grand theories and
(2) the grand traditions that underlie our attitudes toward the United States
Constitution. There has been a significant interest in "comprehensive nor-
mative theories" of constitutional law in the past several years, largely be-
cause of what has occurred on the United States Supreme Court itself. In
the Warren years, those who stood in the great liberal tradition did little else
but wax confident in the fresh breezes and sunlight of the judicial activism of
an entrenched liberal majority on the Court. But 1972 changed all that.
Four supposedly conservative appointments to the Court not only
threatened the liberal majority but also raised visions of the ghosts of the
Lochner era when judicial activism served, of all things, nonliberal ends.2
These appointments set the constitutional theorists scurrying to find some
theory of judicial review-some "grand" theory-that simultaneously would
defend judicial activism and limit it to relentlessly liberal goals.
The appointments of 1972 may have been the catalyst for a new interest in
comprehensive normative theories of constitutional review, but Tushnet sees
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; B.A., Harvard University,
1967; J.D., M.A. Yale, 1971.
** Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
A.B., Saint John's Seminary, Brighton, Massachusetts, 1959; J.D., Fordham University, 1964;
M.L.S., The Catholic University of America, 1984.
1. For those not familiar with the Critical Legal Studies movement, an informative and
"critical" article by Michael A. Foley serves as a good introduction. Foley, Critical Legal
Studies: New Wave Utopian Socialism, 91 DICK. L. REV. 467 (1986).
2. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 567-86 (2d ed. 1988).
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that interest at a deeper level, as symptomatic of the crisis of contemporary
liberal theory which itself signifies a deeper crisis in Western society:
[I]t is a commonplace of contemporary social thought that West-
ern society is currently experiencing a crisis of legitimacy. "The
system" is not delivering the goods, and all the ideological struc-
tures designed to explain why the shortfall is defensible, indeed is
inevitable, have broken down. Grand theory and its problems are
just constitutional law's version of this general crisis of legitimacy.
The crisis of grand theory is the form that the failure of liberal
political theory has taken in constitutional law.
The so-called grand theories of constitutional interpretation or review
usually find their basis in, or at least must contend with, two grand tradi-
tions undergirding the Constitution: the liberal tradition and the civic re-
publican tradition. Although the two traditions share some of the same
ideals and allegiances to the same mechanisms of government, they usually
do so for divergent reasons. The liberal tradition (as its root word "liberty"
suggests) stresses the individualism of people acting in society, while the
civic republican tradition stresses the social nature of human beings, the
communitarian ideal. The fact that both traditions converge on some impor-
tant matters probably represents the enabling factor that preserved unity of
thought among the founding fathers long enough for the Constitution to
emerge as it did. Tushnet contends that the liberal tradition has won out,
becoming so dominant in today's thinking that it is now difficult to appreci-
ate the force of the civic republican tradition. The reasons for the emergent
dominance of the liberal tradition may have less to do with its merits than
with the historical flaws in the civic republican tradition, which made sense
only in a society with a restricted franchise and a policy of substantial equal-
ity of wealth. The decline of the civic republican tradition, of course, left the
liberal tradition unchallenged, and there lies the root of our present di-
lemma. Tushnet sees us as being "left with a choice of dictatorships....
Judicial review is often defended as the only way to escape the potential
tyranny of the majority, but it simultaneously creates the potential for the
tyranny of the judges."4 Somewhat surprisingly, Tushnet does not advocate
an effort to revitalize the civic republican tradition, and in fact he suggests
that doing so will likely fail to solve the crisis that besets us in constitutional
law.
In chapter one, under the heading, "The Jurisprudence of History,"
Tushnet critiques several suggested jurisprudential solutions to the problem
3. M. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 3, 4 (1988) (footnote omitted).
4. Id. at 16.
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of activist judicial review. Originalist theory, which may be thought of as
the conventional wisdom, purports to derive the meaning of the Constitution
from the original intent of its makers. It is an approach which instantly and
almost instinctively recommends itself. Did the Founding Fathers not in-
tend that their writing be read the way they intended it to be read? The very
proposition compels itself as a tautological truism. Nor is it a static or un-
realistic approach. The makers of our Constitution knew that the document
could not speak in its original version for all time, and so they inserted an
amendment mechanism. As society changed, the Constitution could change
too, but slowly and deliberately---certainly not by the simple fiat of the shift-
ing majority of legislative representatives, and still less desirably by the sim-
ple fiat of a handful of nonelected justices.
But as compelling as the arguments for originalist interpretation are,
Tushnet's arguments against the theory will place the staunchest originalist
on the defensive. Originalism's "grand theory" does seek to curtail the po-
tential for raw judicial constitutionmaking, and superficially it seems to be
an excellent, perhaps the best, tool for doing so. But Tushnet suggests that,
in order to serve its purpose, originalist theory must presuppose a determi-
nate intention on the part of the framers. We must know what the framers
intended with respect to what they wrote. Original intent may be discovera-
ble but, much more often than not, efforts to pinpoint it meet with historical
ambiguity, changes in society or technology, the need to draw inferences
from limited evidence, or most often combinations of these factors. In
resolving historical ambiguities, in choosing among logical inferences that
can be drawn from limited or conflicting evidence of original intent, or in
taking account of social or technological change, the "originalist" has quite
a bit of room within which to maneuver, probably as much as the non-
originalist. Tushnet also gives originalists who "bite the bullet" and insist
that the process of discerning original intent itself constrains judicial tyranny
much to ponder. The process they advocate usually is described as imagina-
tive reconstruction.5 We mentally reconstruct the historical setting, the
value system, the mind-set of the framers, and that process, they say, suffi-
ciently constrains the justices. Yet, Tushnet argues,
[T]he understanding we achieve is not the unique, correct image of
the framers' world. On the contrary, our imaginative immersion is
only one of a great many possible reconstructions of that segment
of the past, a reconstruction shaped not only by the character of
the past but also by our own interests, concerns, and preconcep-
tions. The imagination that we have used to adjust and readjust
5. See R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS, CRISIS AND REFORM 287 & n.64 (1985).
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our understanding makes it impossible to claim that any one recon-
struction is uniquely correct.6
To suggest that Tushnet's arguments might give even the staunchest
originalists pause is not to suggest that he will convert them. A small bit of
what Tushnet has to say about originalist theory seems ad hominem.7 To
some extent what he says is based on an inference which, perhaps necessar-
ily, begs the question. The principle of judicial review itself is not free from
historical ambiguity.8 This very ambiguity may cause most originalists to
stay very close to the text of the Constitution and remain quite deferential to
legislative assessments of constitutional impact, usually to a greater degree
than nonoriginalists.
The next approach that Tushnet critiques is the neutral principles theory,
developed and advocated principally by Herbert Wechsler.9 "Neutral prin-
ciples," not unlike Kant's categorical imperative," ° demand that the judicial
process be principled in such a way that its analysis and reasoning rest on
forms that transcend the immediate result. While the neutral principles the-
ory purports to impose constraints on arbitrary judicial activism, it does so,
Tushnet reasons, by presupposing a shared societal understanding and ac-
ceptance of those constraints. Such a shared understanding and acceptance
do not exist within the liberal tradition, where each of us is an autonomous
chooser and valuer. In setting the "neutral" principles, a judge possesses an
extensive creative power.
In a legal system with a relatively extensive body of precedent and
well-developed techniques of legal reasoning, it will always be pos-
sible to show how today's decision is consistent with the relevant
past ones, but, conversely, it will also be possible to show how to-
day's decision is inconsistent with the precedents. This symmetry,
of course, drains "consistency" of any normative content."'
As the quote above suggests, the neutral principles theory may be thought
of from two vantage points: content and technique. If the neutral principles
theory violates the liberal tradition in the "content" of the principles estab-
lished, then what of the validity of neutral principles viewed as a "tech-
nique?" Can a consistent, neutrally principled technique of judging not
6. M. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 43.
7. For example, as in his treatment of Raoul Berger's work. See id. at 37 n.55.
8. Id. at 35-38.
9. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959).
10. I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 39 (Library of Liberal
Arts ed. 1959).
11. M. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 51.
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supply the necessary constraints? Tushnet, with a sense of practical reality,
believes not:
The craft interpretation [i.e., viewing neutral principles theory
from the technique perspective] ... fails to constrain the results
that a reasonably skilled judge can reach and leaves the judge free
to enforce his or her personal values, as long as the opinions sup-
porting those values are well written.... Craft limitations make
sense only if we agree on what the craft is. 2
It was, perhaps, thoughts like these that motivated the great American legal
realist, Jerome Frank, to suggest the all judges be psychoanalyzed prior to
assuming the bench.13 We do not agree on what the craft of judging is.
Next, Tushnet takes on textualism as a purported solution to the problem
posed by judicial review. He divides textualism into unsophisticated and so-
phisticated varieties, based largely on the extent to which the textualist in-
dulges in an assumption that a community of understanding exists among
the readers of the Constitution. Judge Easterbrook, himself a textualist, well
recognized the distinction in the context of interpreting statutes: "If the
meaning of language depends on a community of understanding among
readers, none is 'right.' ,,4 Sophisticated textualism, on the other hand,
rests not on a community of understanding, but rather on a community of
experience, a common experience that breeds habit, familiarity, and a sense
of normalcy in meaning. We are a historical community; we share some-
thing. Unsophisticated textualism, Tushnet argues, is not soundly based.
Sophisticated textualism, while more soundly based, fails to constrain judges
to the degree needed in order to prevent abuses of judicial review. And tex-
tualism in all its forms, Tushnet concludes, is defective because it gives us a
Constitution with the politics left out.'"
In chapter two, Tushnet deals with John Hart Ely's theory of representa-
tion-reinforcing review. 6 Originally based in the famous "footnote 4" of the
United States v. Carolene Products Co. opinion,' 7 representation-reinforcing
12. Id. at 52, 54.
13. J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 203, 251 (1949).
14. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 536 (1983) quoted in M.
TUSHNET, supra, note 3, at 63.
15. M. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 68.
16. See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
17. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The Court said:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Consti-
tution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific
when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legis-
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review focuses on access to political processes. It justifies judicial interven-
tion on the basis of a need either to eliminate the causes of deficiencies in
access to the political processes, or to mandate corrective action, by creating
the situation which would have existed if all had been afforded full and fair
access to political processes. It is a liberal "market" type theory, based on
majoritarianism. It is not a "fundamental rights" type theory, except insofar
as purported fundamental rights have something to do with the political
processes.
The problem with the theory of representation-reinforcing review, accord-
ing to Tushnet, is that it simply doesn't constrain judges enough. If, using
the theory, one confines its application to the formal, official avenues of ac-
cess to the political processes, then the theory's reach is too limited to be
effective. Every oppressed individual has, for example, the formal, official
right to ask his government representative to get a law passed to relieve the
oppression, has the right to testify at the hearing, and other rights. The
courts need to focus on the informal, unofficial obstacles. If they do adopt
this emphasis, however, little or nothing exists to constrain their assessments
of the political realities inherent in such obstacles. Tushnet says: "If repre-
sentation consists in formal mechanisms, the theory appears to be inade-
quate to guard against tyranny by a congressional majority; but if
representation occurs through informal mechanisms as well, the theory loses
its force as a guard against tyranny by the judiciary."18 Tushnet's critique of
representation-reinforcing review is thorough, both analytically and themati-
cally. He confronts the themes that gave rise to the famed Carolene Products
footnote as well as the main themes dealt with in Ely's work: exclusions
from the vote, antigovernment speech, and categorical discrimination based
on race, gender, and other characteristics, concluding the critique with an
account of the erosion of moral support for capitalism and democracy that
has resulted from the complexities of American politics and federalism. His
conclusion, each step of the way, is that representation-reinforcing review
yields situations in which judges are empowered to impose their own value
schemes and even their own economic theories.
lation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibi-
tions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation. ...
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of stat-
utes directed at particular religious .... or racial minorities .... whether prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seri-
ously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judi-
cial inquiry.
Cited in J. ELY, supra note 16, at 75-76 (citations omitted).
18. M. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 75.
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In chapter three, under the heading "The Jurisprudence of Philosophy,"
Tushnet examines what perhaps is the prevailing approach to judicial review
in the popular mind: the notion that judges decide what is constitutional or
unconstitutional on the basis of moral philosophy. Tushnet identifies the
problem as "metaethical skepticism." 9 Others might think of it as ideologi-
cal pluralism, the point being "the liberal tradition's insistence that in order-
ing our public institutions we may not give one person's view of the good
more weight than another person's."2 That argument would seem to be a
fair response to those who would press for a "deontological" approach, that
is, one based on some a priori code of moral philosophy that governs con-
duct regardless of context.21 But there are other approaches in moral philos-
ophy to which the metaethical skepticism of classical liberalism is only a
partial barrier, and Tushnet tackles them as well.
Tushnet divides the moral-philosophy approaches into two categories:
systematic and communitarian. He defines systematic moral philosophy as
"the application of the tools of reason and analysis to a set of relatively ab-
stract principles, which are themselves defended in relatively abstract ways,
from which conclusions are drawn about the moral status of particular laws
or conduct.",22 This definition seems to fit the concept of a deontological
approach to ethical decisionmaking: the notion that there are moral truths,
discoverable by human reason, which govern human conduct.23  At first
blush, this systematic moral philsophy approach seems well suited to the
liberal tradition, which Tushnet acknowledges is committed "to a rule-ori-
ented moral philosophy, in which relatively general rules are stated and ap-
plied to individual cases.", 24 Against this systematic approach, Tushnet
posits the "competing tradition in moral philosophy" which may be de-
scribed as the "teleological" or "situational" approach and which he identi-
fies as a "holistic," "contextualized" approach. 25 The latter he sees as a
refutation of the former. And the latter, in turn, he refutes:
Whichever way we approach the question of deciding what
moral truth is in a real setting, we get lost. If we start with a gen-
eral truth we cannot identify the particular truth that the general
one is supposed to encompass. If we start with a judgment about
truth in a particular setting-a situation ethics-we are met imme-
19. Id. at 109.
20. Id.
21. See W. FRANKENA, ETHICS 16, 17 (2d ed. 1973). Tushnet does not use the terms
"deontological" and "teleological".
22. M. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 111.
23. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
24. M. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 112.
25. Id. at 113.
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diately with plausible redescriptions of the setting that shake our
confidence in our initial judgment.26
The other type of moral philosophy identified by Tushnet is the communi-
tarian approach. While systematic moral philosophy, when used as a justifi-
cation for an activist judicial review, may falter on the shoals of ideological
pluralism and metaethical skepticism, a "communitarian" approach might
have a better fate, as it ordinarily is based on some understanding of a phi-
losophy of justice implicit in the community itself. The trouble lies in the
difficulty of identifying these communitarian values. It is in the process of
identification that communitarian moral theory fails us. Can we identify
common values deeply-rooted in our nation's history and traditions? Of
course we can, and many of our most cherished Supreme Court precedents
appear to be based on this communitarian notion of morality. Yet the ap-
proach has its limits. Tushnet suggests that the "appeal to common values
... would seem unable to justify the invalidation of... statutes... restrict-
ing the availability of abortion." '27 Moreover, the communitarian-values ap-
proach is quite obviously subject to manipulation, especially in terms of the
level of generality chosen by the judge. We can, of course, agree that domes-
tic privacy is one of our cherished, deeply-rooted community values. But
can we say the same of private, consensual homosexual sodomy? Yet both
considerations may exist in the same case. In the final analysis, because
what is or is not a common value must be decided upon by someone, it is not
obvious why the courts should rely on their own ideas rather than those of
the elected representatives of the people.
Tushnet's critique of a communitarian-moral-theory approach toward jus-
tifying activist judicial review is strong and informative, but there is one very
recent formulation of a communitarian approach with which he seems to
have greater difficulty: Ronald Dworkin's famous "serial-novel" meta-
phor.28 Dworkin has suggested that judicial review be understood as part of
a collaborative enterprise in the writing of a novel. Legislators, administra-
tors, and courts are all collaborators in the writing of the novel of the law.
Each is both empowered and delimited: empowered, because each is truly
an author; delimited, because each must hold faith with what the prior au-
thor or authors have written. This metaphor, Tushnet recognizes, "has a
normative component-the obligation to make the novel the best possible
one-and a historical component-the prior chapters."29 Tushnet's critique
is that the metaphor becomes less workable if we choose to accept the view
26. Id. at 119.
27. Id. at 134.
28. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 229-38 (1986).
29. M. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 141.
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of the literary and artistic "de-constructionists," a view which Tushnet calls,
with a disturbing amount of generalization and overinclusiveness, "modern-
ism." The fact is that Dworkin's metaphor makes good sense in terms of
"traditional" literary theory. Moreover, "de-constructionism" has a long
way to go before it can transcend the appellation of a trendy fad.
There is a strength in the community-values approach to activist judicial
review, and one senses that Tushnet, though critical of the approach, appre-
ciates its grounding. Indeed, he recognizes it as "a contemporary version of
the republican tradition. ' 30 Why, then does he not embrace it? He explains:
The vision of community that animates the appeal to community
values is simultaneously pernicious and inspiring. It is pernicious
because it imagines that community now exists, that we simply
have to reach for the brotherhood of man in the fatherhood of
God. It is inspiring because it tells us that even if community does
not now exist, we can begin to create it. We need not await the
revolution that will transform society, for by acting on our vision
of community we make society different.31
One might wish that Tushnet had devoted more space to what he refers to
as the pragmatic defense of the theory of judicial review, i.e., the notion that
"all things considered, it is good to have judges thinking that they should do
the right thing.",32 Unfortunately, Tushnet seems to confine his analysis of
the "pragmatic defense" to a critique of the simplistic thesis that somehow,
regardless of its merits or defeats, the theory of judicial review "works." His
argument is that it doesn't necessarily "work" and he sustains it by examin-
ing the actual operation of the theory in the context of free speech. What
Tushnet says, in his refutation of the pragmatic defense, is true and impor-
tant, and hence well worth reading, but it is not a refutation of pragmatism
in general.
Tushnet's main point in this rebuttal is that "judicial review entrenches
the repressive urges that it then must attempt to control.",33 It is because
judicial review is available, strong, and predictably thorough that legisla-
tures feel justified in going over the edge a bit, in erring on the side of
majoritarian oppression. The courts, they know, will bail them out if they
go too far. It is this very phenomenon that allows us to be somewhat care-
less in the selection of our legislators-we do not really have to rely on them
in the final analysis. In truth, Tushnet is only refuting the defenders of prag-
matic judicial review and not pragmatism itself, as indicated by his admoni-
30. Id at 145.
31. Id.
32. 1d at 123.
33. Id. at 128.
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tion that a "pragmatic liberal ought to remember that courts can invalidate
affirmative action programs as well as segregation." 34
In the final analysis, Tushnet's attitude toward a moral philosophy of judi-
cial review rings negative not so much because he opposes the idealism and
the inspiring elements in the various ethical theory approaches, but because
he seems to be looking for something deeper-something that, at base, will
obviate the problem of judicial review itself. His cryptic conclusion is that
"the ideas behind the republican tradition may make judicial review based
on the values of a true community both possible and unnecessary. 35 If we
base a theory of judicial review on community values, it founders as a the-
ory, because we are not a community. If we somehow become a commu-
nity-a true community-we won't need a theory justifying activist judicial
review. Whereas the Marxist might see radical social upheaval as the route
to true "community-ness," the republicanist might view activist judicial re-
view as one means to the goal of communal cohesiveness. But Tushnet per-
ceives no more value in grasping for theoretical "universal". truths than he
does in awaiting a revolutionary transformation of society, concluding that,
"[i]nevitably we will have to abandon the false security of theory and open
ourselves to the risk of tragic error as we take political action. 36
In chapter four, Tushnet continues his analysis of republicanist thought,
as he evaluates antiformalism. Antiformalists, in one way or another, reject
the search for constraints on judicial activism. Most antiformalists draw on
the republicanist tradition in their acceptance of the notion of communitar-
ian values, but they do not recognize a formal coerciveness in their under-
standing of judicial review. Judicial decisions are thought of as rhetorical
activity, components in a social dialogue. Tushnet finds some of their argu-
ments, especially those of the anarchist antiformalists, 37 "disquieting" in
that their rhetoric seems "conservative.,
38
More interesting is his treatment of "intuitionist" antiformalism. 39 This
approach reveals what may be the quintessential "solution" to the problem
of the judicial review power, one suggested by Aristotle and re-echoed in the
writings of Jerome Frank' and many others. Perhaps recognizing the folly
of trying to find theoretical constraints on the power of judicial review in
34. Id. at 131.
35. Id. at 146.
36. Id. at 145.
37. See generally J. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS
OF LAW (1985).
38. M. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 155.
39. See, e.g., Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REv.
1103 (1983).
40. J. FRANK, supra note 13, at 203, 251.
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situations of ideological pluralism, Aristotle suggested, in Book VI of his
Nicomachean Ethics,4 1 that we ought to concentrate more on the judicial
selection process, and look for judges who possess the correct character
traits to be able to handle the responsibility of power. Aristotle honed the
traits down to one particular virtue, which he called "gnom," 42 and which
Tushnet recognizes correctly as "practical reason.", 43 Aristotle recognized,
as Tushnet reiterates, that "the faculty of practical reason, like all human
faculties, depends for its sound exercise on appropriate training and disci-
pline."'  Ancient Aristotelian thought is too easily criticizable as "hardly
vibrant"4 5 and as grounded to some lesser or greater extent on Aristotle's
acceptance of the institution of slavery, and Tushnet does not neglect the
opportunity to raise those points.46 Mercifully, he does not deal with some
of the modem but less contemporary echoes of Aristotle's gnomd theory,47
but his critique of the Aristotelian view seems strained and limited to associ-
ational considerations. For example, Tushnet gratuitously surmises that se-
rious discussions of the relation between the Aristotelian tradition and law
have occurred only in journals sponsored by Roman Catholic institutions.4 8
A reader's reaction is likely to vacillate between the extremes of "not so!"
and "so what?" In either case the reader is left with a desire for a more
serious refutation.
Of course the Aristotelian focus on the virtue of practical reason (or
gnomd) has strong implications for the contemporary republicanist tradi-
tion. Practical reason is a human capacity that implies interconnections
with other humans. It implies communitarian or public values, and that
implication leads directly into the republicanist tradition in which public life
is not simply the reflex of private interest, but rather something like a dia-
logue. In this view, adjudication is a social process by which judges give
meaning to public values. Tushnet seems to see an incipient revival of the
republicanist tradition,49 but he is not at all sanguine about it. One problem
is that the focus on "public" values is occurring in a "process" milieu and
the process rarely gives content to the public values." The process is such
41. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (M. Ostwald trans. 1962).
42. Id. at 165.
43. M. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 160.
44. Id. at 161.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 162.
47. For example, directly manifesting the Aristotelian quest for "good" judges, Jerome
Frank suggested that all judicial candidates undergo psychoanalysis. J. FRANK, supra note
13, at 203, 251.
48. M. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 161 n.53.
49. Id. at 162, 166-68.
50. Id. at 164.
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that we use public values rather than seek them, and under current condi-
tions the end result is more likely to be domination than dialogue. Tushnet,
in his critique of the idea of a revival of the republicanist tradition, invokes a
theme that appears again and again throughout his treatise. The system has
to be changed drastically before society will have the kinds of judges who
will promote a republicanist view; and with such a drastic social transfor-
mation, the need for an activist republicanist judiciary is lessened, perhaps
even obviated: "[A] republican society does not need a vigorous judiciary.
By the time judges were the kinds of people who would promote a jurispru-
dence of public values, the citizenry would have a politics of values and
would therefore rarely generate the sort of legislation that republican judges
would want to correct."51 In an appendix to chapter four, Tushnet takes on
conservative and neotraditionalist theories. He argues that the "original-in-
tent" quest of the conservatives is a chimera, resting on the stability of lan-
guage which in turn must rest on the stability of institutions and institutional
arrangements. But "change" exists and occurs, and "the central weakness of
conservative social theory [is] its inability to account for the coexistence of
stability and change."52 Political conservatives will not appreciate Tushnet's
reduction of their social thought to "nostalgia," but they've heard those ar-
guments many times. Nor will liberals like Michael Perry appreciate
Tushnet's reduction of their "neotraditionalist" theory to roughly the same
thing. Although Tushnet spares them the characterization of "nostalgia,"
he seems to equate their view of a community tradition with a retrospective
aspiration for "the New Deal and its judicial embodiment, the Warren
Court."
53
Tushnet's fifth chapter, which he calls "Intuitionism and Little Theory,"
is curiously named, for in it he tackles the question of a grand unified theory
of constitutional law-a comprehensive metatheory which unites and allo-
cates the various earlier-discussed theories. Of course he argues that no
grand unified metatheory exists, and what we are left with is essentially ideo-
logical pluralism, a number of approaches each claiming validity and
supremacy. This is a situation which, however realistic, is unacceptable in
the judicial system: "The subjects of a liberal state.., cannot accept plural-
ism in the courts. It is bad enough that legislatures can oppress them, but at
least they may hope that judges will keep legislatures in check. Pluralism in
constitutional theory makes it impossible to keep judges in check."54
We miss the point if we keep looking to the judiciary for salvation and we
51. Id. at 167.
52. Id. at 172 (footnote omitted).
53. Id. at 175.
54. Id. at 185.
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spin our wheels when we search for grand unified metatheories to justify or
to rationalize progressive judicial activism. "The task of constitutional the-
ory ought no longer be to rationalize the real in one way or another. It
should be to contribute to a political movement that may begin to bring
about a society in which civic virtue may flourish."" With those sentences,
Tushnet ends part one of his book, the critique part. It is a telling sentence,
that final one. It sounds like a call for regeneration of republicanist thought
in constitutional law: "[T]he issue is not how we should decide to live our
own lives, or what a good metaethical theory is, but is instead a question of
institutional design. How can we organize institutions that exercise power
over us but do not oppress us?" 56 Tushnet's answer is in the final four chap-
ters of the book, under the "metaheading": The Constitution of Society.
Chapter six, under the heading "The Constitution of Government," treats,
in part, American legal realism,57 a school of thought from which, as he
acknowledges, Tushnet's critical arguments descend. Tushnet sees two
strains in realist thought: critical analysis and policy analysis.5" As critical
analysts, the realists "attacked the idea that legal doctrine provides an objec-
tive basis for decisions in specific instances." 59 As critical analysts, the real-
ists were expert debunkers. As policy analysts, however, the realists found
themselves on the receiving end of the debunking process. Their insistence
that correct legal decisions could be reached through "middle-level abstrac-
tions,"'  which would dictate or at least indicate the correct policy to be
furthered in the given case, was problematic. At worst, if law is only policy,
then the fight over which policy ought to be furthered would seem to be just
another version of Hobbes's bellum omnium contra omnes. At best, a law-
as-policy approach is simplistic. Policies, even admittedly progressive ones,
often conflict. And finally, a law-as-policy approach is tolerable only so long
as what is being furthered is a policy with which we agree. Policy analysis
can become politicized, and this of course "threatens the liberal tradition,,
61
both classical and contemporary.
The second part of Tushnet's chapter on "The Constitution of Govern-
ment" introduces the main theme of the second part of his book. In it,
55. Id. at 187.
56. Id. at 185.
57. See, e.g., B. CARDOzO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921); J. FRANK,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457
(1897); Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-the Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930).
58. See M. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 191.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 192-93.
61. Id. at 196.
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Tushnet treats "structural due process" or "structural review,"" a concept
now emerging in such constitutional law decisions as Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 63 in which the Supreme Court invalidated a United States Civil Ser-
vice Commission regulation barring resident aliens from jobs with the fed-
eral government. The decisional theory seemed novel: The governmental
interest in regulating the employment rights of aliens lay with Congress or
the President, not with the Civil Service Commission."
A second branch of the theory of structural review is, perhaps, more rele-
vant to Tushnet's main theme. It arises in equal protection cases quite regu-
larly: the notion that not only must the proper agency make the decision in
question, but also that the agency must use proper processes and articulate
proper reasons. Courts often look for evidence in legislative-history materi-
als that legislatures did indeed intend a particular classification and that leg-
islators articulated permissible grounds for the classification in question.
These two branches of "structural due process" or "structural review" seem
otherwise unremarkable. Tushnet critiques them and concludes that they
fail to accord with the demands of the "liberal tradition." He also, however,
poses a question in connection with the equal-protection branch of the the-
ory: If we were to write the articulated-reasons requirement large, by apply-
ing it in a generalized fashion to legislative acts, could the legislature
survive? Tushnet's thought is that such a requirement "would destroy the
legislative process as we know it. '"65 But he asks the question anyway, and
explores it in succeeding chapters. The result, he suggests, would be a
"judicialized legislature," which might be just as objectionable as a "legisla-
tive judiciary," and the liberal tradition would be suspicious of both.66 But
one of the candid theses of the realists was that judges do make policy, that
is, "legislate," and impose their will instead of merely their reason. Tushnet
ends the chapter with another cryptic statement, curiously without citation
to authority: "Some Realists ... knew that judicial willfulness alone is not
enough to explain the law, because they saw patterns of decision that could
not arise unless something underlay them all. For the Realists this unseen
62. For an explanation, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1673-87 (2d
ed. 1988).
63. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
64. Id. at 115-16.
65. M. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 210. Tushnet maintains that:
Much legislation is adopted by city councils and state legislatures which keep quite
rudimentary records of what precedes formal enactment.... Moreover, frequently-
perhaps usually-there are no reasons for legislation except that the legislators who
voted for it thought that they would win votes by doing so or that this statute seemed
a fair compromise between contending political forces.
66. Id. at 213.
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force was social power. , 67 It is that "social power," the "unseen force," that
operates to shape our understanding of the social world, according to
Tushnet.68
What he means by "social power" becomes clearer in chapter seven, under
the heading "The Constitution of the Bureaucratic State." Chapter seven
contains what will seem to some an astonishing thesis: that welfare-state
bureaucracies ought to be "repoliticized." Tushnet recognizes, of course,
that the prototypical politicized bureaucracy is "the classic urban machine"
with patronage and government largess distributed in exchange for votes.69
As things stand now, the Court has confronted that kind of politicized bu-
reaucracy by, in effect, recognizing a new kind of property, the right of ac-
cess to government benefits, most particularly welfare benefits. Goldberg v.
Kelly7° signaled the ascendency of this "new property" by applying the due
process clause to public-assistance termination decisions. The cases that fol-
lowed Goldberg and the government activity that developed because of them
is suggesting two types of bureaucracies: what Tushnet refers to as "ratio-
nalized bureaucracies," typified by the Social Security Administration, with
a somewhat rigid focus on rules and regulations, and "professional bureau-
cracies," typified by child-welfare agencies, with more of an ad hoc focus on
professionalized decisionmaking as to what is best for the recipient or benefi-
ciary." The Court seems to be basing its analyses upon a presumption that
only these two types of bureacracies exist. Needed, suggests Tushnet, is a
"repoliticized bureaucracy," though not, of course, the kind of politicized
bureaucracy that flourished in the ward-heeler days. Tushnet advocates "re-
politicization" in the context of that "unseen force": social power. Ratio-
nalized bureaucracies can have this unseen force injected into them with the
insertion of such mechanisms as "community control." Professional bureau-
cracies can be similarly repoliticized by "insisting on participation by clients
in bureaucrats' decisions."72 But the control and participation, Tushnet
urges, must be real, and not merely utilitarian in the sense that people will
feel better or less dissatisfied for having participated. The control must be
actual control. As an example, Tushnet suggests what he acknowledges to
be the "utopian" idea of radically decentralizing and deprofessionalizing re-
sponsibility for domestic tranquility by establishing "neighborhood patrols
67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 215.
70. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
71. M. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 215-16.
72. Id. at 217.
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as police forces."'7 3 Tushnet's ideal identifies direct empowerment of the cli-
ents of the bureaucratic state with real authority over decisions affecting
them as "the best way to begin fulfilling the promise of due process.",
74
In chapter eight, entitled "The Constitution of Religion," Tushnet sagely
acknowledges that the constitutional law of religion is in disarray and notes
as a reason that it "is founded on a tradition that the courts no longer fully
understand. '75 As a consequence, "contemporary constitutional law just
does not know how to handle problems of religion.",76 Behind these observa-
tions and conclusions lies the event to which Tushnet refers repeatedly
throughout the book: the historic victory of the liberal tradition over the
republicanist tradition. The religion clauses spring from the republicanist
tradition of the late eighteenth century. Religion, in that tradition, serves as
an "intermediate" institution between the levels of individual and state, in
which civic responsibility and a concern for public values can be fostered.
But this view of religion is based on institutions which no longer exist. "The
democratic revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries . . . re-
quire that the republican vision be revitalized by large transformations of the
social order."
77
The chapter on religion may well be the best in the book. Not only does
Tushnet acknowledge candidly "the indisputable fact that most framers ex-
plicitly understood that the religion clauses were designed to bar the national
government from ... interference with existing establishments of religion in
the states" and that it is, in light of that fact "not entirely coherent to say
that the amendment is now applicable to the states,",79 (a fact and an impli-
cation usually overlooked by religion clauses analysts), but he fits the some-
what disordered and inconsistent modern Supreme Court precedents into a
helpful set of principles. Some of the cases serve what Tushnet refers to as
the reductionist principle, which reflects the underlying notion that religious
belief is indistinguishable from other forms of belief, usually those forms in-
herent in the free-speech protections.8' Others serve the marginality princi-
ple, which "holds that the law must recognize religion only to the extent that
religion has no socially significant consequences. ,81
Both of these principles seem to diminish the significance of religion in
73. Id. at 245.
74. Id. at 246.
75. Id. at 274.
76. Id. at 248.
77. Id. at 275.
78. Id. at 252.
79. Id. at 253 n.19.
80. Id. at 249, 257-64.
81. Id. at 264.
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public life, and such a diminution is certainly consistent with the liberal tra-
dition. The trouble is that it is not consistent with what is perhaps the domi-
nant nature of religious activity itself. Religion is necessarily a communal
activity, and religious institutions, at least at that communal level, do not fit
easily into the liberal tradition.8 2 The Constitution nonetheless recognizes
them and separates them explicitly from the less communal, more individu-
alistic forms of expression and belief that are protected in other clauses. The
first amendment thus recognizes a nonindividualistic principle, a principle
which fits quite nicely into the republicanist tradition.8 3 But again, the
republicanist tradition is not fully understood by the courts, and changes in
institutions over the centuries have made a completely originalist under-
standing of the tradition inappropriate anyway. On this point, Tushnet of-
fers a suggestion. He cites with apparent approval a proposition made by
Arthur Sutherland in the wake of the school prayer decisions: the possibility
of mutual forebearance vis-a-vis government and religion.8 4 Citizens might
forebear in the assertion of their religious claims upon society in the face of
knowledge that civic actions that generate intense hostility are not likely to
be in the overall public interest. On the other hand, they might forebear in
challenging some civic actions which are designed to promote intensely held
religious feelings. The suggestion is so obviously problematic that one won-
ders why Tushnet would find it so attractive. One cannot help but surmise
that Tushnet bases his approval of this radical mutual-forebearance sugges-
tion on a kind of faith or trust-perhaps on the concept of an "unseen force"
mentioned earlier in the book 8 -the idea that there is some "social power"
at work behind the scenes in the political equation, some sort of "Planck's
constant" that "affirms the impulses to connectedness that religious belief
mobilizes" and will assure the proper recognition and development of the
"nonindividualistic principle" that religion serves in our scheme of things.86
Moreover, few will be willing to cast the first stone at a principle as com-
munally refreshing as that of mutual forebearance.
Tushnet deals with free speech issues in chapter nine, under the heading
"The Constitution of the Market." By analyzing the case law and argumen-
tation involved in three specific free-speech issues-campaign finance, com-
mercial speech, and pornography regulation from the feminist perspective-
Tushnet uncovers what he sees as a preference in contemporary constitu-
tional law for "instrumental rationality" at the expense of "nonrational de-
82. Id. at 269-72.
83. Id. at 272-75.
84. Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARv. L. REV. 25, 52 (1962).
85. M. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 213.
86. Id. at 249.
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liberative capacities." The Supreme Court appears more inclined to protect
types of speech which convey their message on straightforward, rational,
means-to-end levels of communication, and to give less protection to types of
speech which convey their message on what might be called a subliminal,
emotional, and psychological level. Tushnet doesn't define the terms in pre-
cisely those words; rather, he relies on illustrations to convey his meaning.
For example, a familiar type of commercial advertising is that "designed to
convey a noncognitive message about the attributes of the type of person
who buys the advertised good not about the attributes of the good."
87
Tushnet sees pornography as appealing to this nonrational or noncognitive
deliberative capacity.8 8 Under the republicanist perspective, he finds, such
appeals are of less value to society than messages intended to provoke ra-
tional deliberation. 9
But both grand traditions, liberalism and republicanism, support the view
that instrumental rationality, and not the noncognitive deliberative capacity,
should govern public life. Liberalism bases its support on the notion that
human beings possess sufficient rational evaluative capacities to accept or
reject political or commercial claims on their merits. Republicanism, on the
other hand, may harbor a doubt or two on that score, but accepts the capac-
ity for instrumental rationality as at least an attainable ideal. This support,
of course, affects constitutional doctrine, and speech regulation decisions
seems to fit into a framework structured by instrumental rationality.
One might suspect that these observations would lead Tushnet toward an
acceptance of, for example, pornography regulation, but this is manifestly
not his point. Indeed, he contends that feminist arguments in favor of por-
nography regulation mix appeals to instrumental rationality with appeals to
the noncognitive deliberative capacity. While Tushnet apparently argues for
an expansion in the constitutional doctrine of free expression to cover ap-
peals to capacities beyond merely instrumental rationality, his main point
seems to be that prevailing constitutional doctrine in the area of free expres-
sion is severely problematic. His preferred solution is consistent with his
prior themes, a form of politicization: "[T]he most effective way out of the
difficulties posed in all three areas [campaign finance, commercial speech,
and pornography] is by means of openly political evaluations of proposed
institutional arrangements, including in that category the status quo and
moderate reforms as well as fundamental alternatives."9a In the end, he
seems to identify these "openly political evaluations" with "nonreformist re-
87. Id. at 290.
88. Id. at 293.
89. Id. at 289-91.
90. Id. at 279.
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forms," fairly accomplishable by political activists, but which have the po-
tential to "set in train a larger transformation of the political system." 9'
One thinks-with either nostalgia or trepidation, depending on one's world
view-of the progeny of the old and near-forgotten free speech movement at
Berkeley.
Tushnet concludes his book with a reiteration of his themes and a view
toward reform. The liberal tradition, now firmly in control, makes constitu-
tional theory necessary. The tradition demands that those in power be re-
strained. But the liberal tradition also makes constitutional theory
impossible, because restraints on those with legislative power cannot effec-
tively coexist with restraints on those with judicial power. Tushnet's solu-
tion is not an alternative synthesis of the theories he critiques. Rather, he
appears to invite us to settle on a focus different from the effort to restrain.
We are to focus on political activity looking toward the vision of society as a
commonwealth. There are several specifics in that vision: substantial equal-
ity in wealth, decentralization of authority, and a rethinking of the concept
of property as the foundation of a citizen's independence toward a "new
property" characterized by guaranteed jobs and tenure in private employ-
ment. Society as commonwealth looks to alternative methods of resolving
conflicts, perhaps making use of our noncognitive deliberative capacities. It
recognizes "community" as a joint public project.
Clearly, Tushnet is attracted by much in the republicanist tradition: "The
republican tradition emphasizes experiences of love and connectedness that
the liberal tradition places in the background; it places in the background
experiences of threat, anger, and autonomy that the liberal tradition empha-
sizes."" But in the end he refuses to embrace it, and with good reason. It
does seem that one permanent feature of our constitutional landscape has
been the grand debate-originally between the classical liberals and the
republicanists, today, of course, between the political liberals and conserva-
tives. Our institutions have kept the debate as a debate, with the issues
changing from time to time along with the names of the debaters, and each
side sometimes scoring well and seeming to gain the upper hand only to lose
it to the other. Tushnet is wise enough to know that what is needed is not
victory for the republicanists, but rather, to somehow turn the debate into a
dialogue. "Human experience consists of connectedness and autonomy, love
and hate, toleration of others and anger at their differences from an ever-
changing 'us.' Neither the liberal tradition nor the republican one can
91. Id. at 312.
92. Id at 317-318.
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accommodate the aspects of experience that the other takes as central. Cri-
tique is all there is."'93 Critique, perhaps, and that unseen force known as
"social power." 94
93. Id. at 318.
94. Id. at 213.
[Vol. 38:135
